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INTRODUCTION 
Trade unions in Malta have been in existence for over a century in some 
form or other. However, for many decades after the first attempt to establish 
a fitters' union at the Dockyard in 1884, trade unions made little headway. 
The general social climate of the day was still strongly anti-combinationist, 
viewing trade unions and other forms of worker organization as outrightly 
hostile and subversive activities, sabotaging the freedom of the free market 
mechanism. The non-existence of any institutional machinery for employer-
worker negotiation made local unionism ineffective anywayl. 
This condition changed dramatically after 1945. A spate of supportive 
legislation was ushered in, no doubt partly fomented by the labour front 
established by the Malta Labour Party (MLP) and the newly established General 
Workers' Union (GWU), then enjoying a period of astronomical growth. The 
Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance (No 4 of 1945), in particular, 
gave trade unions a legitimate operative function in the rapidly industrializing 
society which was Malta at the time. Trade Unions in conformity with this new 
legislation were registered with the Registrar of Trade Unions who published 
their names and membership totals on an annual basis. Such registration was 
carried out by identifying "unions" as belonging to one of three possible, dis-
tinct categories: Combinations of workers; combinations of employers; mixed 
combinations of employers and workers. It was not until the Industrial Relations 
Act (IRA) of 1976 that this categorization was revised, introducing the concept 
of employers' associations (organizations consisting wholly or mainly of em-
ployers) distinct from trade unions proper. The Act made also clear the primary 
purpose for the existence of such bodies: the regulation of relations between 
them. The intermediate category (combinations of employers and workers) 
was written off, with the constituent associations being transferred to either 
trade union or employer association status. Other bodies whose raison d'etre 
was not the regulation of industrial relations were struck off the register2. 
The Registrar of Trade Unions (a post which has been invariably occupied 
by the Director of Labour) has been submitting without fail an annual report 
to the Minister responsible for Labour Affairs, who then passes it on for 
publication in the Government Gazette, as per Section 14 of the IRA. The 
report, which compiles the number of trade unions and respective membership 
figures as at the end of June each year, is published usually in the autumn 
months3. This article discusses trends in local trade unionism and associated 
issues on the basis of a critical approach to these published reports. 
The Report by the Registrar of Trade Unions reveales 34 trade union 
organizations with 39,132 members on the register as at June 1976. This 
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changed to 24 unions with approximately 68,638 members as at June 1990. 
Durfng this 14-year spell the dynamics of the size, catchment area and number 
of trade union organizations can be looked upon as revealing indicators of 
the economic and political restructuring taking place in Malta at the time. 
A MODEL FOR TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP? 
Contemporary studies which seek to establish an econometric model 
for the growth of trade union membership on the basis of inter-
national comparison generally agree that a high rate of change of prices 
and a correspondingly high rate of change of wages and salaries in condi-
tions of labour shortage are the conditions which tend to foster rapid 
labour unionization, until a saturation among unionizable workers is 
reached4. All three conditions were present in Malta during the years 
1976-1980. 
Yet, the number of unionized workers in Malta did not show the increase 
suggested by this theoretical model. Indeed, the local union membership 
figures actually fell marginally. In contrast, the period 1981 - 1986 saw high 
levels of unemployment, and a period of prices and wages frozen by dictat 
intended to contain the effects of an international recession. Rather than a 
dWindling interest by workers in seeking affiliation in trade unions, the period 
registered a vigorous boost of union membership levels, when the domestic 
labour supply (the total number of Maltese working or officially seeking work) 
remained approximately the same or actually fell over the epoch. 
How can one explain this mismatch between predicted and actual 
behaviour? One suggestion is that the decision to seek trade union membership 
or otherwise is basically a psychological and personal one which is not readily 
amenable to either generalisation or prediction. Some individuals may seek 
trade union membership for the very same reasons which induce others not 
to join (such as high unemployment, likelihood of redundancy, rampant 
inflation). While it is appreciated that ultimately, all decisions are personal 
choices, general laws of tendency concerning decisions resulting in social 
behaviour may be nevertheless postulated on the basis of sound systematic 
arguments and supported by empirical evidence. In this particular case, 
Significant general tendencies have been observed among workers in the 
market economies of the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden and 
Australia, suggesting that labour unionization is positively correlated to market 
conditions which increase the lobbying power of trade unions. Workers in these 
countries have joined unions when they understood that market signals are 
in their favour and therefore union membership and action will be a profitable 
investment, hopefully yielding improvement in wages and other working 
conditions. They have conversely shown disinterest in union membership when 
the market conditions spelt out a loss of union bargaining power. 
Perhaps a second, better explanation would be that, given that Malta is 
a developing economy with a state dominant in labour affairs (as the major 
employer, legislator and determiner of industrial relations practices), it is far 
more realistic to explain worker affiliation in trade unions on the basis of 
contextual, political events, particularly government actions and organized 
labour reactions to these. Politics, may thus serve as a more powerful 
explanatory variable for unionization dynamics5. 
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Until the late 1970's, the large majority of Malta's unionized workers 
were engaged in the fortress economy, servicing the British naval, air and 
~~~~~~~military~pI'esence-onlheJ.sland.-lndeed,-the-CtIi\Ce_behind~~the establishment 
of local trade unionism in the late 1880's and then again in the 1940's 
was precisely to offset the hardships of mainly manual, skilled and unskilled 
labour associated with the colonial administration as well as to stave off 
the threats of dismissal and redundancy. The latter blindly followed in the 
wake of colonial employment and labour policy revisions, often themselves 
influenced by the presence or likelihood of warfare in the Mediterranean 
basin. Other than teachers, it was only employees at the Dockyard (then 
run by the British Admiralty), and those in the employ of the U.K. Government 
who were unionized, the latter two groups being organized within the 
GWU. Thus when the services rundown took place, thousands of union 
members lost their jobs. The U.K. Government Section (GWU) - still 
strong with 3,953 members registered in June 1971 - was totally phased 
out by 1979. Of course, most of the workers made redundant from the 
wound up fortress economy found alternative local employment. Apparently, 
however, the urgency towards unionization was not so strongly felt. This 
would explain the moratorium on union membership registered over the 
epoch 1978 -1980. 
TABLE 1 TRADE UNION STATISTICS 
Year Trade Union Number of GWU CMTU Rest 
Membership Unions (%) (%) (%) 
1975/6 39,132 34 69.8 20.8 9.4 
1976/7 39,092 35 65.9 21.1 13.0 
1977/8 38,915 37 66.2 21.4 12.5 
1978/9 38,890 23 68.5 25.5 6.1 
1979/80 39,238 19 68.7 26.4 4.8 
1980/1 42,415 22 67.5 25.5 7.0 
1981/2 49,912 20 65.8 30.2 4.0 
1982/3 48,609 14 62.5 33.7 3.8 
1983/4 46,434 13 60.6 37.2 2.2 
1984/5 52,297 14 58.3 39.8 1.9 
1985/6 53,008 16 58.7 40.0 1.4 
1986/7 60,872 21 59.3 38.2 2.5 
1987/8 63,413 21 57.3 40.2 2.5 
1988/9 67,301 23 56.9 40.9 2.2 
1989/90 68,368* 25 57.4 40.8 1.9 
* Provisional figure likely to be revised upwards 
Source: Report of the Registrar of Trade Unions, Dept. of Labour (various years) 
With respect to surges in union membership figures, a cursory look at the 
published statistics (See Table 1) reveals four 'peaks' of association, and these 
are all discernible in the second epoch: 1981-1988. 
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LOCAL GENERAL ELECTIONS 
Two of these peaks are directly coincident with local general elections. 
Given the intense mobilization of support carried out by political parties during 
election campaigns, it is to be expected that a partial repercussion of this 
campaign is an increased mobilization by trade union organizations for 
registering new members. And this is accompanied by a heightened interest 
among workers in registering their solidarity by associating themselves with 
a particular union. Of course, this is mixing politics with trade unionism. But 
neither of the main political parties in Malta has spared its efforts in advising 
workers in the choice of union affiliation. The GWU, already at its inception 
closely associated with the Malta Labour Party, cemented the labour front with 
a polemical statutory fusion in 1978. In the meantime, the Nationalist Party, 
then in opposition, has since advised workers to leave the union "which has 
lost its teeth" and to join the "free trade unions". The main and obvious 
beneficiary in this case being (since 1979) the only other general union in 
Malta, the Union Maddiema Maghqudin (UHM). 
In the building up to the December 1981 and May 1987 elections, 
membership in Maltese trade unions rose by 10,674 (July 1980 -June 1982) 
and by 7,868 (July 1986 - June 1987). The membership increases in the 
General Workers' Union were 5,683 (1980-82) and 5,003 (1986-87) 
respectively. In both instances the major recruiting areas were the public and 
parastatal sectors. In spite of an expected saturation effect, these sectors had 
witnessed considerable new employment, particularly in the months prior to 
the 1987 elections. In this latter case the union membership increase was 
supplemented with the opening of a new market for trade union membership 
that of pensioners. 
Although traditionally less trade union conSCiOUS, workers with mainly 
Nationalist sympathy are likely to have rallied to the ranks of the UHM. It is 
plausible to consider that this enthusiasm was a result of the perceived 
systematic encroachment by the MLP - GWU tandem in major areas of social, 
economic and political concern. The materialization of such a "Big Brother" 
corporate entity loomed even larger and truer to life following the Labour 
Government's tough reaction to a series of industrial actions organized by non-
GWU unions in 1977. UHM membership doubled from 5,851 in July 1980 
to 10,906 in June 1982,75% of this increase being to the credit of private 
industry. A further increase of 2,002 was registered from July 1986 to June 
1987. It is to be noted however that, in spite of lower saturation levels among 
such a group of workers, lower increases than those enjoyed by the GWU 
during the same period were registered. 
SURGES IN INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
The other two increases in trade union membership figures within the 
period under review are coincident with two "industrial actions" which are 
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particular because of their strong political overtones. The first was held 
on June 29th 1982, a traditional holiday among the Maltese - Imnarja - but 
which had been among the public holidays lost when the number had 
been cut down drastically by the Labour Government in the name of national 
productivity and industriousness. The Nationalist Party had directed workers 
not to report for work on that day in protest against the loss of tradi-
tional holidays but primarily in protest at the 'perverse' election result of 
1981, when the NP found itself for a third term in opposition in spite 
of (this time) gaining a slim but absolute majority of votes. Workers joined 
either of the two general unions in those tense days perhaps as a concrete 
expression of solidarity, under pressure from more acutely mobilized 
workmates and/or friends, and also as "insurance" in case of possible re-
prisal action for participating in industrial action. The extent to which 
this particular event per se contributed to trade union membership increases 
cannot unfortunately be isolated because the statistics relating to this 
particular event also include membership increases reported just before and 
after the December 1981 general elections. 
The second industrial action can be diagnosed more properly. In spite 
of occurring in the relatively calm inter-election period, trade union 
membership figures jumped a staggering 5,863 upwards in the twelve month 
period July 1984 -June 1985. The main explanatory condition in this case 
was the Church Schools - Labour Government dispute. It incorporated a 
seven week crippling lock-out cum strike by teachers (the longest ever by 
the local teaching profession) and a solidarity strike by the Confederation 
of Malta Trade Unions (CMTU)on October 10th 1984. Once again, the pressure 
was on for workers to take sides. Both the GWU and UHM registered increases 
of approximately 2,400 each. The Movement of United Teachers, already 
heavily saturated with 3,452 members, increased its membership nevertheless 
by 223. 
An equally impressive increase among trade union membership has been 
reported by the Registrar of Trade Unions in his latest three annual reports 
covering the period July 87 -June 90. An overall increase of 7,766 is reported, 
with the GWU and the UHM again stealing the show with substantial member-
ship increases each. This time, the increase can be credited to a cluster of 
diverse factors. The rallying of MLP sympathizers within the GWU can be seen 
as a defence mechanism to insure against the MLP defeat in the 1987 general 
elections and the alleged discriminatory measures against known MLP activists 
by the new superordinates. These also included a further 935 pensioners. Still 
others have joined unions grouped within the CMTU, possibly sensing that 
these would gain an upper hand in individual or collective negotiation out-
comes, given that there was now a more sympathetic political party in power. 
Such, however, may not explain the whole picture: It may be that various 
workers with Labour sympathies have joined nevertheless the UHM, for the 
same reason of riding the bandwagon as mentioned above. Possibly (but less 
likely) workers who voted Nationalist in 1987 may have joined the GWU 
arguing that this union, more than any other, is likely to fight tooth and nail 
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for improving conditions of work, now that the Nationalist Party is in power. 
Events since then have probably lent weight to such an argument. 
Of course, such statements are not backed by hard and fast evidence. 
Unfortunately the subject matter is sensitive and highly confidential. Nation-
wide surveys on matters relating, directly or indirectly, to political party affairs 
have never been validly collected in Malta. Nevertheless, if one looks for 
corroborative evidence elsewhere, a similar switching of trade union affilia-
tion according to the government of the day has been observed in other 
countries with a pluralist trade union structure such as India and Spain. It 
is also likely that the correlation between partisan sympathy and trade 
union association will improve once again as yet another general election 
campaign sets in. 
THE UNIONIZABLE LABOUR FORCE 
The analysis of changes in trade union membership levels must also take 
into consideration the size of the unionizable labour force. Trade unions are 
defined by law as associations consisting wholly or mainly of workers. This 
means that a union may register as members individuals who are not 
recognised as workers - in the sense of participating in productive 
remunerated employment - as long as these are not in a majority within the 
union. Such non-workers include pensioners, students, employers, housewives, 
the unemployed and others with informal or temporary work contracts -
homeworkers, part-timers, student-workers, casual labourers. 
Given that the primary objective of trade unions remains that of in-
fluencing the regulation of relations at the workplace, trade union bodies 
have been generally neither successful nor enthusiastic in recruiting non-
working members into their fold. No doubt, this resistance is matched by 
equally diffident and disinterested citizens who, as non-workers, perceive 
few if any advantages to be gained from trade union affiliation. (Witness, 
for example, the fruitless attempts by the UHM at establishing a section 
for the unemployed in 1982 -83). Nevertheless, the outcome of industrial 
relations spills over beyond the workplace and influences by and large 
all sections of the population as dependents on wage-earners, as consumers 
and/or as beneficiaries of a given social order or economic policy. There 
are therefore ample justifications for inviting non-workers within trade 
union ranks just as much as there are reasons for trade unions being concerned 
with issues wider than industrial relations proper - such as housing, 
health, education, development policy or inflation. The GWU has followed 
in the footsteps of other trade union bodies on the European continent by 
establishing a fully-fledged Pensioners' Section. In three years, this section 
can boast of 3,018 members. 
The UHM, though tempted, has as yet not followed suit: one maip reason 
being that such a move is likely to disrupt the healthy activities of the 
Pensioners' Association, a national organization. The Association of Pensioners 
of the Nationalist Party (APAN) is a second competitor. Both of these are not 
registered as trade unions. 
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THE SIZE OF THE GAINFULLY OCCUPIED POPULATION 
A noteworthy variable in considering the size of the unionizable labour 
force is definitely the size of the gainfully occupied population. This is the 
section of the population which is likely to be on the forefront of union 
recruitment drives. It is also that section of the population most likely to seek 
and desire union affiliation, by virtue of its occupational status. 
The corrected end-of-year official statistics indicate (see Table 3) that while 
employment rose steadily until 1980, the period 1980 - 83 is characterised 
by a shedding of over 8,000 workers (of which 5,000 from manufacturing 
industry) in response to an international contraction of trade. The trend 
resumed a comforting, upward character after 1984, matching and exceeding 
the record employment figures of 1979-80 by 1987. Given that the major 
contraction of Maltese wage employment in the last 14 years coincided with 
a surge in trade union membership (as discussed above), the composite effect 
has been a considerable increase in the unionization rate or, as it is 
alternatively referred to, the level of trade union density (measured as the 
percentage of the economically active population which is unionized). In spite 
of a contraction of the labour supply by 2,000 between 1980 - 82, trade union 
membership figures increased by 10,674. The resulting change in unionization 
rate is therefore from 32.5% (1980) to 42.0% (1982). Other rapid increases 
in union density are witnessable for 1984/85 and for 1986/87. Union density 
now stands at all time high of about 51 %. 
Such a trade union density figure compares very well with that achieved 
by other countries: (Refer to Table 2) Centrally planned economies now 
undergoing transition are excluded). Note that the reliability of statistics and 
the meaning of trade union membership is contextually variable: 
TABLE 2 UNIONIZATION RATES IN SELECTED MARKET ECONOMIES 
AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, DENMARK, NORWAY, SWEDEN Over 50% 
ALGERIA, GERMANY, ITALY, TANZANIA, UNITED KINGDOM 40-50% 
ARGENTINA, BARBADOS, CHILE, ETHIOPIA, FIJI, GREECE, GUYANA, 
PORTUGAL, SINGAPORE, SRI LANKA, SWITZERLAND, VENEZUELA 30-40% 
BAHAMAS, COLOMBIA, EGYPT, GABON, HONDURAS, JAMAICA, 
MEXICO, THE NETHERLANDS, TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 20-30% 
BOTSWANA, BRAZIL, COSTA RICA, ECUADOR, FRANCE, KENYA, 
MALAYSIA, NIGERIA, PANAMA, PERU, PHILIPPINES, UNITED STATES, 
ZAMBIA 10-20% 
BANGLADESH, BELIZE, EL SALVADOR, HAITI, INDIA, INDONESIA, 
NEPAL, PALESTINE, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, SENEGAL, SIERRA LEONE, 
THAILAND, TOGO. less than 10% 
Sources: World Labour Report (1985) I.L.O. Geneva. p. 11 European Trade Union Institute, 




TABLE 2 LOCAL LABOUR MARKET STATISTICS 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
1. Gainfully Occupied 
Population 108418 112315 114298 116741 116732 113061 108353 108512 
2. Registered Unemployment 4831 5057 4196 3294 4039 5680 10356 10283 
3. Labour Supply or EAP 
(GOP + U) 113249 117372 118494 120035 120771 118741 118709 118795 
4. T.U. Membership 39132 39092 38915 38890 39238 42415 49912 48609 
5. T.U. Density: % of (4 + 3) 34.6 33.3 32.8 32.4 32.5 35.7 42.0 40.9 
6. Unlonlzable Labour Force"" 103890 108580 110339 115520 118115 115595 115372 115371 
7. Corrected T.U. Density: % of 
(4+6) 37.7 36.0 35.3 33.7 33.2 36.7 43.4 42.1 
Sources: Report of Registrar of Trade Unions, Department of Labour (various years) 
: Economic Survey, Office of the Prime Minister (various years) 
" = estimate 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
109189 110623 115109 121921 124973 126564 
10448 9938 8499 5630 5153 4659 
. 
119637 120561 123608 127551 130126 131223 
46434 52297 53008 60872 63413 66868 
38.8 43.4 42.9 47.7 48.7 51.0 
116279 116198 118309 120400 123410 127800" 
39.9 45.0 44.8 50.6 51.4 52.3· 
" " = The difference between Item 3 and Item 6 above is due to non-unionizable workers explained further below in the text. The numerical 
difference is worked out in Table 4 below. 
UNIONIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION 
Clearly there is a link between the level of socio-economic development 
and the degree of trade union density. Industrializing economies which still 
have the bulk of their labour force engaged in agriculture and/or petty urban 
self-employment - areas traditionally immune to trade union infiltration -
have low unionization rates, though these may be expected to peak-up in the 
medium term if and when industrialization strategies bring about increased 
job opportunities. On the other hand, de-industrializing economies such as 
the United States are switching primarily towards a tertiary, small scale, service 
orientation, which sector is again traditionally relatively disinterested in trade 
union affiliation. ObViously, nation specific factors (such as legislation, state 
labour policy, labour movement history and/or cultural traits) help to explain 
inter-country differences. 
The high rate of unionization in the context of industry-rich economies 
(as is contemporary Malta) is not coincidental. International research has 
established that certain areas of employment are much more trade union prone 
than others. Specific power relations, operation in strategic areas, relative 
spatial concentration and isolation tend to foster high levels of work group 
consciousness and solidarity and, consequently, high levels of union affiliation. 
Occupational categories located in such an environment include miners, 
dockworkers, shipbuilders er repairers, drivers and railwaymen. These are 
traditionally and internationally the most militant workers and they exhibit the 
highest degree of unionization across national frontiers. Their counterparts 
in the Maltese scenario are the Drydocks and the Port Workers. Although the 
economic restructuring going on over the last decade has caused some decline 
in employment levels of such traditional union strongholds, state intervention 
has staved off further redundancies. 
NON UNIONIZABLE WORKERS 
Yet another item of consideration which must not be missed is that, while 
both workers and non-workers are generally eligible for trade union 
membership, some occupational groups are expressly barred from joining a 
trade union. The main reason for this is the application of military discipline. 
Thus in Malta, the Police, the Armed Forces and other labour corps established 
under such conditions - such as the Dejma Corps and the disbanded Pioneer 
Corps and Task Force - prohibit their members from joining trade unions, 
since such is deemed to interfere with the necessarily autocratic management 
of these organizations. 
Thus, the unionizable labour force and the gainfully occupied population 
are not one and the same. Nor has the difference between them exhibited any 




TABLE 4 NON-UNIONIZABLE WORKERS IN MALTA 
Dec 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
Police Civilian & 
Uniformed 1562 1454 1440 1687 
AFM Civilian & Uniformed 827 843 818 950 
Revenue Security Corps 13 45 
Dejma 
Task Force 
Airport Company 125 
lira u Rabbi 386 385 372 347 
Dirghajn il-Maltin 4250 4095 3861 954 
Malta Pioneer Corps 2334 2015 1651 407 
Total 9359 8792 8155 4515 











1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
1446 1451 1414 1420 1538 1726 1839 
401 376 406 371 372 535 1199 
42 41 42 42 175 204 197 
895 988 924 1831 2534 3739 3297 
416 427 438 518 497 767 -
137 141 134 181 183 180 184 
- - - - - -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
3337 3424 3358 4363 5299 7151 6716 
The statistics indicate that, apart from 2,000 odd regular members in the 
Police Force and Armed Forces, workers in labour corps were gradually being 
phased out as new, regular employment options were becoming available in 
the period 1976- 1981. Since then, however, the figures have shot up again, 
reflecting the excess labour supply of the epoch. (The data excludes the 
Auxiliary Workers & Training Scheme whose members could seek trade union 
affiliation). Subtracting such non-unionizable workers from the gainfully 
occupied population (refer again to Table 3) shows that the corrected 
unionization rate in Malta is even higher than it appears to be: Current 
corrected union density may thus be close to 53%. 
DUAL UNION MEMBERSHIP 
A final, critical consideration to be made with respect to trade union 
membership statistics is that these are disguising to an unknown degree an 
element of dual union membership. Thus, while the Registrar of Trade Unions 
reported 68,638 members on his register in June 1990, the actual number 
of workers who are members of a trade union is less than that figure. Dual 
union membership, particularly in the GWU and a CMTU affiliate, is a 
phenomenon which trade unions claim undermines their negotiating strength 
and bargaining platform. The phenomenon can lead to situations whereby more 
than one union enjoys an absolute majority of workers (50% + 1) as members 
in a particular workplace. This is also to the consternation of the respective 
management staff, who is thus faced with the prospect of unwarranted 
industrial action intended merely to secure or clarify a particular union's 
recognition as the sole bargaining agent. Industrial relations legislation has 
nothing to say about this phenomenon of dual allegiance. Probably, the 
condition barely existed at the time when the Industrial Relations Act (1976) 
was formulated and therefore did not warrant particular attention within that 
act. Yet no trade union body, other than the MUT, expressly bars its members 
from being members of any other trade union. Given the prevalent defensive 
orientation with which Maltese workers perceive trade union affiliation, dual 
union membership may be seen as analogous to opening savings accounts 
in two different banks, thus withdrawing rewards from either according to the 
exigencies of the moment. Otherwise, dual union membership may serve as 
a compromise between joining the union of one's choice and joining the union 
which commands majority representation at one's workplace and which 
therefore exercises the right of collective worker representation. Once again, 
hard and fast evidence on this phenomenon is scant. 
UNION FORMS ... 
The term "trade union' is really a generic expression for a collection of 
different structures and organizing principles, each of which has its own 
peculiar merits and deficiencies. Three such organizing principles explain the 
structure of trade unions in Malta: 
The craft or occupational union is that which organizes workers on the 
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basis of the~e sharing the same skill, occupational grade or job description. 
The craft union remains the basic organising principle for union bodies in 
the United Kingdom. The arrangement makes for inter-industry solidarity and 
standardization of wages and working conditions for workers sharing a similar 
occupational placement, irrespective of the particular enterprise environment 
in which they work. This, however, is also impervious to the particular 
enterprise's "ability to pay": it has a tendency for penalising poor performers 
by forcing them to accept wages and conditions higher than they would 
otherwise concede in bilateral negotiation: and rewarding successful 
companies by settling for working conditions less than they would be willing 
or anxious to achieve. The system also generates at times chaotic multi-
unionism at the enterprise, with no limit to the number of represented unions. 
The opposite arrangement is the house or company union, whose 
catchment area is restricted usually to a single territorial unit (a particular 
factory) or a small number of units in the case of a chain of firms operating 
under the same ownership. Workers of different skill levels, aptitudes, 
responsibilities and wage structures are lumped together under the same union 
banner. The inspiration behind the structure is to provide a unitary, integrating 
dimension to trade unionism, promoting commitment to the enterprise ethic 
and to "team spirit" even in the pursuit of union demands. Such a system 
is indeed common injapan and c n integral part of the "japanisation" process 
underway in many industrializec market economies today6. Management and 
union officials would thus oper.1.te in a neater, one-against-one situation. A 
house/company union gives its officials the best opportunities for receiving 
company information and taking action. 
Company unions may thus pester managements incessantly with trivial 
demands and petty disputes. However, house/company unions tend to be 
isolated bodies with few or no solidarity links with unions beyond their 
enterprise gates. Thus, the extent to which they can escalate industrial action 
(actually and potentially) is severely curtailed. Such unions may also have 
a hard time reconciling the different (and at times contradictory) demands 
of their motley membership. They may thus end up alienating different sections 
of the workforce. 
The general union seeks to combine the strength of territorial 
representation with inter-industry solidarity. A general union has therefore 
the largest potential for membership growth. It seeks to organise all 
workers in all enterprises. This gives it strength in numbers, including the 
possibility of carrying out secondary industrial action in furtherance of a trade 
dispute, as well as in the involvement of political (over and above industrial) 
concerns. This strength is however achieved only at some expense: individuals 
and small interest groups may feel lost in a large, gargantuan organization, 
where their problems are too inSignificant relative to others for union offic~als 
to feel that they deserve any particular attention. Professional, technical, 
supervisory and managerial personnel may feel that the large unskilled, manual 
representation in the general union structure forces the union to act invari-
ably in the interests of this majority segment of the membership. A ware 
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of these problems, general unions may seek to decentralise and to grant a 
limited degree of speCific sectoral, territorial, industrial or skill represention 
by establishing apposite sections and/or branches, coordinated in a federative 
or confederative network. 
... AND EMPLOYER STRATEGIES 
Various employer (including State) and management strategies have been 
deployed to counter the power and influence of each of these three union 
organising prinCiples. Some managers and employers may prefer not to have 
unions at alF; but once in a position to request recognition at the workplace, 
a union cannot be readily disregarded. 
The most successful containment policy has been affected with respect 
to house/company unions, some of which are actually set up on the initiative 
or with the blessing of management. These unions may be systematically 
defused of militancy and transformed into more benign, docile, "social clubs" 
for workers. While maintaining a healthy channel for the articulation of 
demands and protests, they may thus actually serve to enhance enterprise 
productivity and profitability. 
House or company unionism may also be used as a tactic to dissuade 
workers from joining general unions. General unions are less likely to resort 
to industrial action than house unions, given that they have a broader outlook. 
But, when they do, they are more problematic for management to deal with 
since they command support and membership from workers spread over many 
enterprises. Failing the existence of corresponding generally organised 
countervailing employer or management aSSOCiations, it is often the task of 
States to impose some order and control on the potentially very powerful 
general brand of unionism. Such order may be implanted via corporatist 
arrangements, whereby the union sacrifices some powers for the sake of 
gaining others which, however, increase its responsibility in decision making 
and policy formulation and, consequently, its affinity with the status quo. 
Curbing legislation is a second option. 
Strategies for coping with craft unions can be effective both at enterprise 
and sectorallevel. 'Divide and rule' strategies may be instigated at the company 
level: Specific and strategic groups of workers may be pampered and privileged 
more than others to foster an elitist anti-collective consciousness among the 
select few; such pampering may cultivate feelings of jealousy among the rank 
and fileS. Such workers may then be adamant in participating in industrial 
action instigated by 'their' union and this may help buffer effectively the extent 
of union influence. The same can occur at an industry level, whereby the 
conditions of work of one occupational grade (as advanced by one union) may 
be played off against those of another grade (as advanced by another union) 
which serves as a traditional referent group9. This leads to lateral struggles 
among workers rather than vertical ones by workers against managers or 
ownerslO. Otherwise, craft unionism may be tolerated because it acts as a 
spur for efficiency and profitability on the industry as a whole: the weak are 
weeded out; the powerful are rewarded by generating greater retained profits. 
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TABLE 5 TRADE UNIONS ON THE REGISTER IN JUNE 1977 AND JUNE 1985 
Reg. Name Membership Membership 
No. Declared Declared 
(1977) (1985) 
1 Malta Union of Teachers 3,044 3,675c 
4 Society of Technical Civil Servants 116 d 
15 Established Employees Association 72 d 
16 General Workers' Union 26,267 30,528 
24 Malta Public Service Association 22 d 
25 Government Printers Union 38 d 
32 Malta Govt. Prof. Officers' Assn. 72 d 
51 Medical Association of Malta 432 109 c (1) 
52 Ghaqda Ghalliema Universita 71 d 
55 Society of Administrative Civil Servants 205 d 
58 Public Officers Union 79 d 
73 Musicians Union 106 d 
75 Society of Civil & Public Servants Malta 38 d 
103 The Lotto Receivers Union 138 160 c 
123 Malta Union of Assistant Chemists 20 d 
128 Secondary School Teachers Association 497 d 
130 Malta Govt. Employees Union 3,712 15,821 c (2) 
140 Unjon Nazzjonali tad-Dwana 146 d 
142 Agric. Produce Brokers & Packers Union 39 d 
144 Drydocks Senior & Exec. Staff Union 99 86 c 
146 Malta Library Association 73 d 
147 The Civil & Public Service Assoc.- 262 d 
Malta Branch 
155 Malta Film Artistes Association 195 d 
164 Malta Union of Bank Employees 845 988 c 
166 Simonds Farsons Cisk Staff Association 76 d 
167 University Technicians Association 34 d 
169 Central Bank Executives Union 105 d 
172 The Civil Service Pensioners' Alliance - 823 d 
Malta Branch 
176 Maddiema u Studenti Ghawdxin Maghquda 660 d 
180 Malta Union of Nurses 542 d 
181 Unjon Impjegati Ndustrijali S.F.C. 1977 263 314 b3) 
189 Chamber of Pharmacists - Trade Union 
-
' 7 
199 Ghaqda Maddiema Bluebell - 275 
200 Airline Pilots & Flight Engineers Union - 31 
205 Union of Govt. Licensed Tourist Guides - 181 
212 Union of Assistant Chemists - 59 
219 Union of Flight Attendants - -
Total No. of Unions 31 14 
Mean No. of Members per Union 1,261 3,735 
L ... 
Notes: (1) The Medical Association of Malta was cancelled from the register in 1979 for not 
conforming in constitution to the LR.A. It was however reregistered (No. 209) in 1981. 
(2) In 1985 the MGEU had been re-deployed as the UHM. 
(3) Changed name to 'Unjon Impjegati SFC 1977' in 1979 
c = a CMTU affiliate 
d = dissolved 
- = not yet established 
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THE SITUATION IN 1977 
The 1976/77 Report by the Registrar of Trade Unions reveals 31 trade 
unions on the register in June 1977 (Refer to Table 5). Of these, 26 are craft 
unions, organising workers falling into a distinct occupational category. Some 
such unions (Registration Numbers 25, 52, 144, 166, 167,169, 181) organ-
ised a specific group of workers in a specific private or public catchment area, 
and they therefore suffer from the territorial isolation experienced by housel 
company unions and discussed above. For a number of others, the area of 
operation is the large public sector. But the absence of a clear demarcation of 
the catchment areas worked out by the unions operating among the general ser-
vice grades (of which there are not less than ten) leads to inter-union poaching 
and multi-union representation: In short, weak and ineffective trade unionism. 
The Malta Union of Bank Employees (Reg. No. 164) is the only union on 
the register which corresponds to a fourth type of union, the industry union, 
seeking to organise all workers, from charwomen to managers, employed in 
the banking sector (which is made up of more than one banking establish-
ment). 
Three out of the remaining four on the 1977 register are general unions: 
One (Reg. No. 176) attempts at organising workers on the basis of their 
territorial origin: The Gozitan identity had served in the past also to foster 
political parties with this distinct character and agendall . But, similarly to 
such parties, Gozitan trade unions have not made much headway in the local 
scene. Apparently, being Gozitan is not a suffiCiently strong organising 
principle where trade unions are concerned. 
FIGHTING MIGHT WITH MIGHT 
The remaining two general unions deserve a In0re elaborate discussion. 
The larger and older is the General Workers' Union (GWU) which remains 
to date Malta's only trade union which has been formed on truly general lines 
ever since its inception in 1943. The union in 1977 could boast of 67.7% 
of total union membership: Two out of every three unionised workers were 
GWU members. These were in turn organised under eight separate sections, 
divided equally among private industries and the public/UK Govt. sector. 
Following far behind in terms of both history and membership is the Malta 
Government Employees Union. The MGEU, with 3,712 members was, in 1977, 
still in the transition from a craft to a general union. It had seen the light of 
day as the Malta Government Clerical Union in 1966 as an offshoot of the 
Malta Civil Service Union. It expanded its catchment area first to include all 
Government employees and subsequently, in 1978, to become a truly general 
union under the title Unjon Maddiema Maghqudin (Union of United 
Workers - UHM). 
The reasons for the change of status can be understood in the light of 
the events taking place at the time. While the GWU, traditionally the most 
militant union, took a more acquiescing stance (especially in the public sector) 
during the 1970s, the non-GWU unions, traditionally uneasy in the pursuit of 
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industrial action, found themselves on the warpath in defence of various 
prf3rogatives, suddenly under threat: Bakers, farmers, doctors, professional 
public officers, bank clerks followed one another in pursuit of industrial action. 
Unfortunately for them, their actions were not concurrent: Government 
successfully isolated each belligerent faction until it spent itself out. The events 
were a lesson in the weakness of craft unions when in confrontation with the 
state. 
The only alternative was to fight might wit{t might. This took two general 
directions. One was to invest in a general union, hence the birth of the UHM 
in 1978. In the same year, the Registrar of Trade Unions reports a record 14 
trade union dissolutions, among which were long established associations (See 
Table 6). These altogether relinquished a total of 1833 members for UHM 
absorption. (The UHM membership in the period 1978 -79 actually increased 
43% from 3,805 to 5,436, an increase of 1,631). The second strategy was 
the strengthening of a confederate structure which could combine separate 
unions and coordinate their action without these relinquishing their prized 
separate identity. Thus the Confederation of Malta Trade Unions (CMTU), 
established in 1959, became implicitly recognised as the countervailing 
instrument to the GWU. It acted as such however only once so far: in the one-
day solidarity strike of October 10th 1984. 
, 
c- oo ;:0 0 eo Q'\ eo .-. ~ C':l '1" to 1.0 r- eo Q'\ to c- t::: co O'i 0- N C0 ~ liS iD t::: co ~ I Q'\ .-. .-. c- c- c- eo eo eo eo eo eo eo eo eo 
No. of new union 
361 registrations 2 7 3 3 3 3 1 0 1 3 6 2 2 
No. of union 
dissolutions 8 5 14 5 3 4 6 1 0 1 1 0 2 50 
of which 
HOUSE UNIONS: 
registrations 1 5 2 3 - - - - - 1 4 1 - 17 
Dissolutions 1 1 4 3 1 2 - - - - 1 - 1 14 
-
Source: Report by Registrar of Trade Unions (various years) 
The stage was thus set for a rundown of the smaller craft unions. With 
one exception, the number of trade union dissolutions was never exceeded 
by the number of new union registrations over the period 1977 - 84. By June 
1985 (and following the eventful episodes of Mnarja 1982 and October 1984 
already referred to) the number of trade unions was down to a low ebb of 
14 (See Table 5). Of these, six were grouped under the CMTU umbrella and 
reported 20,839 members. Another was the GWU, which also benefitted from 
the polarization of the period by shooting up to 30,528 members. Of the 
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remaining seven unions, one (Reg. No. 219) was dissolved without ever having 
its membership figures published. The density of members per union tripled 
in eight years. Only four autonomous craft unions, comprising 341 members, 
remain to be accounted for on the local trade union scene. Of these, the oldest 
dates back only to 1978. Except for those unions grouped within the CMTU, 
not one of the 26 craft unions on the 1977 register was still active in 1985. 
The overhaul of Maltese trade unionism was complete. 
HOUSE UNIONISM 
To be fair, there is yet another story to tell, though it is much less dramatic. 
There is one other union on the June 1977 register: The Unjon Impjegati 
Industrijali SFC 1977. It is the first example of a strict house/company union 
of which Malta had hardly seen the like before12. It is likely that the 
emergence of such house/company unionism in the wider context of union 
polarization is not coincidental. In the same way that the cold war of 
superpower conflict fostered the emergence of a non-aligned movement, some 
workers and owners/managers, were trying to steer away from the inevitably 
charged politicised atmosphere of the GWU-CMTU local cold war. Or else, it 
may have been the experience of disillusionment within the mass ranks of 
the GWU or the UHM which led workers and/or employers to opt for a 
company/house union structure13 . 
The impact of house/company unionism in Malta as yet defies a definite 
assessment (See Table 6). Infiltration by the UHM and/or the GWU into 
enterprises which had established and recognised cOqlpany unions has 
occurred: Both Farsons and Bluebell are cases in pOint. The Casino Employees 
Union, established in 1988, has from the start opted for CMTU affiliation. 
Nevertheless, house unions at Middle Sea Insurance~, Medelec Switch gear and 
General Soft Drinks have so far survived unobtrusively, possibly because they 
were established during the less tempestuous post-1985 industrial relations 
climate14. 
CONCLUSION 
This exercise has skimmed the surface of many interesting issues relating 
to labour organization. A proper comparative manual of local trade union 
structure, function and mobilization has yet however to be written. The scrutiny 
of published statistics has permitted what is hopefully a fresh and original 
assessment of the local trade union scenario. While those who are incredulous 
of the usefulness of the painstaking collection of statistics, year in, year out, 
are certainly numerous (and may include the data compilers themselves), this 
study should serve to show that data can lend itself to useful research. Similar 
investigations may be carried out in other areas where a reliable and regular 
statistical base is available. 
Godfrey Baldacchino, M.A. is Research Officer at the Workers' PartiCipation 
Development Centre, University of Malta and a doctoral student at the 
University of Warwick, u.x. 
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Notes 
1. The best account of the origins of Maltese trade unionism is Fino (1983). See 
also Kester (1980, pp. 23-7). 
2. A recommended text on industrial relations in Malta is Attard (1984). The Industrial 
Relations Act is provided therein as an appendix, obviously without any 
amendments introduced after the date when the book was published. 
3. The relevant reports are found in the Government Gazzette as follows: 
Report for 1976-77: 11th Qct. 1977, pp. 3022-5 
1977 -78: 8th Sept. 1978, pp. 2530 - 3 
1978-79: 5th Oct. 1979, pp. 3134-8 
1979 - 80: 12th Sept. 1980, pp. 2180 - 2 
1980-81: 11th Sept. 1981, pp. 2539-41 
1981-82: 10th Sept. 1982, pp. 2411-3 
1982 - 83: 9th Sept. 1983, pp. 2661 - 3 
1983-84: 7th Sept. 1984, pp. 2753-5 
1984 - 85: 27th Sept. 1985, pp. 2897 - 9 
1985 - 86: 2nd Sept. 1986, pp. 2841 - 3 
1986-87: 6th Oct. 1987, pp. 4251-3 
1987 - 88: 30th Sept. 1988, pp. 3834 - 6 
1988-89: 3rd Nov. 1989, pp. 4870- 2 
1989 - 90: 28th Dec. 1990, pp. 5901- 3 
4. The econometric model developed by Bain & Elsheikh (1976) is expressed as 
follows: 
~T=f(~P, ~W, Ut-I, Dt_1 , E) where 
~ T = proportional rate of change of union membership 
~P = rate of change in prices ( + ve relationship) 
~ W = rate of change in wages ( + ve) 
Ut _ 1 = the level/rate of change of unemployment ( - ve) 
Dt _ 1 = the lagged level of union density, to account for saturation effects ( - ve). 
€ = a random disturbance term 
5. Interestingly, Cohn & Eaton (1989) suggest that a'duster of socio-political variables 
(national elections, inter-union rivalry, ideological distinctions) are more likely 
to explain strike activity than models invoking market variables (such as business 
cycles and trends in economic growth). 
6. Refer to Dore (1983). See Kelly & Richardson (1989) for an assessment of the 
extent of Japanisation in British Industrial Relations over the last decade. 
7. Some employers in the United States commission professional "union busters" 
to break up or prevent a union foothold in their firm. Other firms, like computer 
giant IBM, may prefer being non-union and take pains to develop a particular 
industrial relations climate which generates employee acceptance of this policy. 
See Dickson et. al. (1988). 
8. A tactic which worked against British miners in their eventful one-year strike of 
1984-5. 
9. As is the contemporary outcry by the GWU on behalf of instructors, an occupational 
group whose traditional reference group is that of teachers, represented by the 
MUT. See, for example, the comment and sketch in L-Orizzont (Union Press) 
12/4/91, p. 10. 
10. A point elaborated upon by Burawoy (1979). 
11. The Gozo Party and the Jones Party fielded candidates for the 1947 general 
elections. 
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12. The Simonds-Farsons-Cisk Union dropped the 'industrial' appellative to become 
a pure house union in 1979. 
13. Or with both the GWU and UHM, as in the case of Maldiam employees. 
14. The slackened pressure on a clear GWU-CMTU polarity in the post-1985 epoch 
has also contributed to the emergence of small, breakway unions: The New Lyceum 
Teachers' Union (a splinter from the MUT) and the Union of Cabin Crew (a splinter 
from the GWU's Port & Transport Section) are cases in point from 1989 Report 
by the Registrar of Trade Unions. 
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